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Abstract The efficiency of social housing providers is a contentious issue. In the
Netherlands, there is a widespread belief that housing corporations have substantial
potential for efficiency improvements. A related question is whether scale influences
efficiency, since recent decades have shown a trend of mergers among corporations. This
paper offers a framework to assess the effects of scale and mergers on the efficiency of
Dutch housing corporations by using both a data envelopment analysis and a stochastic
frontier analysis, using panel data for 2001–2012. The results indicate that most housing
corporations operate under diseconomies of scale, implying that merging would be
undesirable in most cases. However, merging may have beneficial effects on pure
technical efficiency as it forces organizations to reconsider existing practices. A data
envelopment analysis indeed confirms this hypothesis, but these results cannot be
replicated by a stochastic frontier analysis, meaning that the evidence for this effect is
not robust.
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1 Introduction
In the Netherlands, social housing is provided by housing corporations1, privately owned
non-profit organizations executing a public task. Dutch housing corporations own over
70 percent of all rental housing, which boils down to one-third of the total housing stock.2
Currently, the Dutch corporation sector is in the spotlights due to various incidents,
ranging from integrity violations to billions of euros lost on high-risk projects and financial
derivatives. These incidents led Parliament to start-up an inquiry in 2013 which concluded,
among other issues, that Dutch government has failed to establish effective control of the
efficiency of the housing corporations (Parlementaire Enqueˆtecommissie Woningcorpo-
raties 2014).
There are several reasons to suspect that housing corporation efficiency is not optimal.
The Dutch government withdrew from active involvement in the 1990s, which greatly
enhanced the autonomy of corporations. The resulting lack of governmental oversight,
combined with weak competition and loose corporate governance, allowed housing cor-
porations considerable operational leeway (Parlementaire Enqueˆtecommissie Woningcor-
poraties 2014). Moreover, housing corporations are not allowed to appropriate profits,
which further weakens the incentive to operate efficiently (Walker and Murie 2007).
Finally, many corporations enjoyed a relatively wealthy position and were able to increase
revenues through sale of formerly subsidized dwellings.
Parlementaire Enqueˆtecommissie Woningcorporaties (2014) suggests that the current
institutional design should be reconsidered because it gives too much occasion for inap-
propriate behaviour. However, Priemus (2003) pointed out that one cannot justify any kind of
reform in the social housing sector because in the current situation ‘we are under-informed
about the efficiency of housing corporations’ (p. 269). Clearly, there is a need for a coherent
measurement of the efficiency of corporations. This paper attempts to fill this hiatus.
An important follow-up question is whether there exists a relationship between the scale
of operations and efficiency. The last decades have seen many mergers of housing cor-
porations, and more are to be expected. The effects on efficiency are far from clear,
however. In many public service sectors, the scale of operations is an important point of
discussion, considering the vast literature on this issue (see, e.g. Holzer et al. 2009; Lei-
thwood and Jantzi 2009; Blank et al. 2011).
The fact that mergers are not always driven by efficiency considerations is illustrated by
the existence of many alternative merger motivations that have been put forward: herding
(Scharfstein and Stein 1990; Devenow and Welch 1996), hubris (Roll 1986), entrenchment
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989), empire building (Rhoades 1983) and institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Research confirms that within the Dutch corporation sector,
only few mergers were conducted out of efficiency considerations (Sect. 3.2).
In theory, the effect of merging on efficiency is ambiguous. In principle, according to
Bogetoft and Wang (2005), a merger can be beneficial (or detrimental) for three reasons.
First, a merger increases scale. If the production technology is characterized by economies
of scale, increasing scale would improve efficiency. On the other hand, if there are dis-
economies of scale, a merger will have a negative effect. Bogetoft and Wang (2005) call
this the ‘scaling or size effect’. If organizations operate under economies of scale,
increasing scale will reduce average costs because fixed costs are spread over a larger
1 The terms housing association or housing society are sometimes used as well. In judicial terms, corpo-
rations are either foundations or associations. In this paper, we use the term (housing) corporation.
2 Source: CorpoData and Statistics Netherlands.
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output, and because of specialization due to a better division of labour (economies of
scale). On the other hand, if organizations grow too large, diseconomies of scale may set in
due to increased internal complexity and weaker connections with customers. As a result,
the unit cost of (public) services is often assumed to be u-shaped, reflecting economies of
scale (downward sloping average expenditures) for units below a certain critical size and
diseconomies of scale for larger organizations.
Secondly, a merger might lead to a reconsideration of business practices because a new
management team is brought in, or because the organizations learn from each other’s
practices. Existing organizations usually have well-established ways of doing things, even
though more efficient practices have become available (technological progress). A merger,
bringing together organizations used to doing things in different ways, forces them to
reconsider procedures and operations and gives an opportunity to learn from each other.
This may result in the adoption of more efficient practices (see also Hansen et al. 2014).3
For the remainder of this paper, we label this reasoning as the ‘shake-up hypothesis’.
Thirdly, a merger combines two sets of inputs and outputs into one set. It might be that
the mixture of this new set is more favourable (i.e. more balanced) than the original sets.
Bogetoft and Wang (2005) call this the ‘harmony, scope or mixture effect’.
In this paper, the main question we try to answer is: What are the effects of scale
increases and mergers on both scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency? This paper
offers a framework to assess the operational efficiency of housing corporations, and to
analyse the efficiency effects of increasing or decreasing scale by means of both a data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
2 Institutional context and recent developments
2.1 The Dutch institutional setting
Many countries provide subsidized housing to low-income households. Although in the
Netherlands, corporations do not receive subsidies anymore, they do have the advantages of a
favourable financial position as a result of subsidies received in the past, and of low financing
costs because of a bail-out scheme that guarantees corporations’ loans. In theNetherlands, the
social housing sector is especially large (Smith and Oxley 2007; Whitehead and Scanlon
2007). In 2012, there were 381 housing corporations, owning 2.2 million dwellings.
As private institutions facing the statutory obligation to execute public tasks, Dutch
housing corporations are hybrid organizations (Blessing 2012). The most salient conse-
quence of their legal structure is the absence of owners, shareholders or influential
stakeholders. Ruled by public law, housing corporations are prohibited to distribute profit
(‘non-distribution constraint’). The corporate governance structure resembles the principal-
agency model (Jensen and Meckling 1976), but the absence of owners allows wealth
sharing by managers and members of the organization (Jensen 2000). Unlike charita-
ble non-profits, Dutch housing corporations are neither donor-financed nor driven by
volunteers. They may be characterized most appropriately as non-profit enterprises (An-
heier and Ben-Ner 2003): professionalized private corporations with a public purpose, and
without residual claimants. The absence of a profit-maximizing objective may weaken
incentives to maximize efficiency (Walker and Murie 2007).
3 On the other hand, increasing scale through merging may reduce competition, which may increase
organizational slack (CPB 2013).
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Also, the ties between government and corporations are weak, both financially and
operationally. Indeed, in 1995, housing subsidies ceased to exist, since the balance of out-
standing government loans and the present value of future subsidy obligationswas paid out as
lump sums. This enhanced the autonomy of corporations and introduced cash windfalls in the
sector (Koolma 2008). Operationally, the only binding condition that has to be fulfilled is that
housing corporations must use all of their resources for (activities strongly related to) public
housing. Additionally, the government has formulated a set of ‘performance fields’ bymeans
of the Social Housing Management Decree (Besluit Beheer Sociale Huursector, BBSH; see
Box 1). However, corporations can freely determine which tasks to give priority. There has
not been an effective system to check whether any of these goals are reached.4
Another reason why efficiency may not be optimal is lack of competition. In the Nether-
lands, the bulk of social housing is in the hands of housing corporations. There is almost no
market sharing with commercial or cooperative organizations. Because of exploitation
schemes where cash flows are negative for the first 10 years after construction, entry of new
housing corporations is almost impossible (Koolma 2008, p. 356). Competition is further
weakened by the regional concentration of the housing stock of the different corporations.
2.2 Mergers
As noted, the last decades have shown a boom in merger activity among corporations. As a
result, the total number of corporations declined from to 858 in 1985 to 381 in 2012.5
Because the total housing stock of corporations remained fairly constant, the number of
dwellings per corporation increased sharply. Figure 1 illustrates this for 2001–2012.
3 Previous empirical research
3.1 Efficiency
Empirical research on the efficiency of Dutch housing corporations is scarce. Koolma
(2008) presents a set of general findings that support the notion that efficiency in the Dutch
Box 1 BBSH performance fields
1. Adequate housing of the target group, that is, households with relatively low income.
2. Preserving the quality of the housing stock.
3. Improving livability of neighbourhoods.
4. Providing housing and fostering services to the elderly, the disabled or other persons that are in need
of care or guidance.
5. Preserving financial continuity.
6. Enabling renters to get involved with corporation policy and administration.
7. Operating efficiently.
4 Note that since July 1, 2015, a new housing Act has been implemented (replacing the BBSH), aiming to
strengthen the ties between the government and corporations and improve supervision. During 2001–2012,
the BBSH was standing legislation. However, although monitored, the goal attainment was not enforced by
the Dutch government.
5 If we were to include ‘municipal housing companies’, who provided part of the social housing in the
twentieth century, the total number was 1152 in 1985. Nowadays, all social housing is in the hands of
corporations. Source: Hakfoort et al. (2002).
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social housing sector could be enhanced. For example, there is large variation in cost levels
and goal achievement between corporations. Also, a random sample of 25 percent of
corporation annual reports in 2002 showed that only two percent of them mentioned the
concept of cost reduction explicitly. This suggests that efficiency might not have been a
major issue in that period.
The only attempt to measure efficiency of housing corporations we are aware of is De
Graaf et al. (2001), who use a data envelopment analysis on a subset of housing corpo-
rations in 1998. The authors conclude that the efficiency potential in the sector is low. The
researchers acknowledge, however, that these results should be interpreted with caution.
Their method of data revision and processing reduces the dataset to only ten percent of the
population.
Our approach differs in five ways from the research of De Graaf et al. (2001). First, we
use a broad panel dataset instead of a cross section, so that the change in productivity can
be assessed. Secondly, our method of combining other data sources with the dataset of
corporations leaves the entire population of corporations intact.6 Thirdly, we use different
output measures. Fourth, we add to this the explicit study of the relation between scale and
efficiency. Finally, we use both a data envelopment analysis and a stochastic frontier
analysis.
3.2 Scale and mergers
Merger motives for housing corporations are quite heterogeneous: improving market
position (Van Veghel 1999; Cebeon 2006; Koolma 2008), increasing professionalism (Van
Veghel 1999), improving efficiency (Cebeon 2006; Koolma 2008) or resolving financial
problems (Koolma 2008; Veenstra et al. 2013). Only a minority of the mergers was
explicitly motivated by taking advantage of scale economies (Van Bortel et al. 2010). This
Fig. 1 Total number of housing corporations, and dwellings per corporation, 2001–2012
6 Because some data are missing and we eliminate outliers, not all corporations can be included in the
analyses, however.
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confirms the notion that for Dutch corporations, efficiency has long not been recognized as
a major issue. For English housing associations on the other hand, efficiency appeared to
be a more important motive (Van Bortel et al. 2010).
Studies on the effects of scale increases and mergers do not find conclusive evidence.
Based on a cross section of housing corporations in 2002, Koolma (2008) finds evidence
suggesting that larger corporations face higher costs than their smaller counterparts,
whereas there is only a weak effect on the scope of their portfolio management and no
effect on the level of investments. This suggests that many corporations operate at dis-
economies of scale. Van den Berge et al. (2013) confirm this by noting that merged
corporations have higher average costs than corporations that did not merge. However,
according to the authors this cannot be ascribed to the merger itself since merging does not
lead to an increase in costs. In another recent study, Crooijmans (2015) investigates the
relation between mergers and several measures that serve as proxies for productive effi-
ciency and finds hardly any significant relationships.
Mullins (2006) indicates that, within the English social housing market, there is a belief
that efficiency gains from increasing scale (and merging) can be obtained. Not all English
housing associations agree on this, however (Mullins 2007). Lupton and Kent-Smith (2012)
argue that there is hardly any relation between costs and scale of English housing associations
and that the effects of mergers are ambiguous as well. However, a few case studies investi-
gated in Lupton and Kent-Smith (2012) indicate that mergers can be successful, but this
success is most probably caused by the merger changing internal processes instead of a scale
effect. This means there may be a shake-up effect. Amerger therefore does not automatically
improve performance. The question is thus whether the efficiency gains could also have been
realized without the merger. That is, is it the scale increase that gave rise to the efficiency
gains, or is it the organizational change and increased focus on efficiency, or both?
4 Methodology
In a sector with a large number of decision making units (dmu’s), relative efficiency can be
measured by comparing the input–output mix of a certain dmu with that of (all) other
dmu’s. In the literature, frontier analysis is the most frequently applied method. Frontier
analyses can be both nonparametric, e.g. data envelopment analysis (DEA, Farrell 1957;
Charnes et al. 1978) and parametric, e.g. stochastic frontier analysis (SFA, Aigner et al.
1977; Meeusen and Van den Broeck 1977). Both parametric and nonparametric methods
construct a best practice frontier based on the data. DEA constructs this frontier by means
of linear programming, while SFA estimates the frontier econometrically. Which method is
most appropriate depends on the setting.
The main advantage of DEA is that one does not need to specify a functional form of a
production function, which is required for SFA. As Pestieau (2009) notes, DEA needs only
a few weak assumptions (free disposability, and the choice between convexity and pro-
portionality in returns to scale). The major disadvantage of DEA is that it fails to account
for noise in the data. Therefore, the impact of outliers in the dataset on the results might be
considerable. Also, Simar and Wilson (2013) argue that using DEA-scores for making
inferences (i.e. using DEA-scores in regression analysis) is difficult and prone to incorrect
estimations since it does not describe the data-generating process in a coherent way.
Because the production function is hard to identify and we do not have data on input prices,
we will first use DEA. As a robustness check, we will also use SFA.
J. Veenstra et al.
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4.1 Data envelopment analysis
We discuss DEA by means of a simple example. Technical details are presented in the
‘‘Appendix’’. Figure 2 provides a case with five dmu’s, one input and one output. Dmu B
has the highest output/input ratio, and therefore the highest productivity, so it is located on
the constant returns to scale (crs) frontier (the dashed line). The crs-frontier assumes that
the relation between inputs and outputs is linear. As Geys and Moesen (2009) note: ‘Such
an assumption may be valid over limited ranges of production, but is unlikely to be
justifiable in general’ (p. 7). Therefore, we may introduce a frontier that assumes a variable
returns to scale (vrs) technology. This is represented by the solid line in Fig. 2.
We may now distinguish between three definitions of efficiency. A dmu located on the
vrs-frontier is pure technically efficient, meaning that given the current scale of operations,
it cannot improve its efficiency. This holds for dmu’s A, B, C and D in Fig. 2. However, B
is the only dmu that has a maximum scale efficiency as well, because it is located on the
crs-frontier. This means that given the current technological possibilities, no dmu is more
productive than B. Therefore, the distance to the crs-frontier measures the total (technical)
efficiency. Total technical efficiency (TEcrs) is thus the product of pure technical efficiency
(TEvrs) and scale efficiency (SE): TEcrs = TEvrs * SE. In Fig. 2, dmu A operates at
economies of scale as it is smaller than the optimal scale level at B. Similarly, C and D
operate at diseconomies of scale.
4.2 Non-discretionary inputs and exogenous variables
Some inputs may be non-discretionary or fixed. These inputs are relevant factors in the
production process in year t but cannot be influenced anymore during the production
process (see Banker and Morey 1986). In the case of housing corporations, the housing
stock at the beginning of the year should be included as a fixed input (see also Sect. 5.1).
Fig. 2 DEA with 1 input and 1 output, crs- versus vrs-specification
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Closely related to the concept of fixed inputs is the idea that there may exist exogenous
variables that influence efficiency scores.7 For example, suppose that dmu A is (dis)ad-
vantaged because of exogenous circumstances. To account for this, we can include the
restriction that this dmu should only be compared with other dmu’s that are not exoge-
nously advantaged relative to dmu A (Ruggiero 1998). In other words, advantaged dmu’s
are being removed from the best practice frontier.
4.3 Malmquist indices
To calculate efficiency changes over time, we use Malmquist indices (see Fa¨re et al. 1994;
Coelli 1996). To clarify this, we give a numerical example (for a general explanation, see
the ‘‘Appendix’’). Suppose dmu A has a crs-efficiency score of 0.6 in year t0. Now, suppose
we were to take the input–output mix of dmu A in year t1, but keep the frontier fixed. If the
efficiency score has increased to 0.75, we can ‘safely’ interpret this as an increase in
productivity of (0.75–0.60)/0.60 = 25 %, because we have used the same frontier (that of
t0) as before. Alternatively, we could use the frontier of t1 both times just as well. If this
would yield a productivity increase of 30 percent, the Malmquist index becomes
H(1.25*1.30) & 1.27. This indicates that total factor productivity change is 27 percent.
Total factor productivity change can be decomposed into a change in technology (i.e.
the total shift of the crs-frontier over time) and the change in efficiency (the extent to which
a dmu approaches the crs-frontier) (Coelli 1996). The change in efficiency can be
decomposed further into pure technical efficiency change (approaching the vrs-frontier)
and scale efficiency change. In the example of Fig. 2, a movement from E to C resembles
pure technical efficiency change and a movement from C to B indicates an increase in scale
efficiency.8
4.4 Mergers and efficiency in a nonparametric setting
As noted, a merger may influence efficiency via (1) a scale effect, (2) an effect on pure
technical efficiency and (3) a mixture effect. In this paper, we will ignore potential mixture
effects of mergers and thus focus on the effects on scale efficiency and pure technical
efficiency. Since we use only one input in our model, mixture gains could only be achieved
by mixing of outputs. Since corporations are single-purpose entities, we assume that
potential gains from mixing are negligible. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, current
software does not allow for a straightforward implementation of mixture effects. In the
next section, our approach is presented.
4.5 Stochastic frontier analysis
As noted, DEA-results are sensitive to data outliers and using DEA-scores for making
inferences may be problematic. Therefore, we use SFA as a robustness check. SFA con-
structs the best practice frontier econometrically by estimating a production or cost
function. Efficiency is then determined by decomposing the error term into a traditional
white noise term (v) and an inefficiency term (u).
7 In fact, exogenous characteristics are often controlled for by treating them as nondiscretionary inputs.
Such a method is, however, outperformed by the method of Ruggiero (1998).
8 Other decompositions of the Malmquist indices are possible (see Simar and Wilson (1998a, b)) for
example).
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Just as under DEA, SFA allows us to construct measures of total productivity change
and decompositions into (1) pure technical efficiency change, (2) a scale effect and (3)
technological change (see the ‘‘Appendix’’ for calculations).
In the next section, our model specifications are presented.
5 Models and data
5.1 Models
Measuring efficiency of organizations in the public sphere faces several obstacles (Stevens
2005; Veenstra et al. 2013). The main question is: What exactly are the inputs and outputs
of the production process? It is especially difficult to distinguish between output (the direct
activities of the organizations) and outcome (the benefit to society as a result of the
activities). Another question is whether data availability is sufficient. In general, we argue
that an output should meet three requirements: it should be (1) measured (i.e. data are
available), (2) it should be influenced by input, (3) it should add to social welfare. In this
paper, we use a basic model ensuring data availability over multiple years: it includes as
outputs the total number of new housing allotments, the number of continued rent contracts
and the increase in housing quality.9 New allotments have been split up into four outputs:
(1) persons below 65, housed adequately, (2) persons below 65, housed inadequately, (3)
elderly housed adequately, (4) elderly housed inadequately. Adequate housing in this
context means providing a dwelling that has a rent that fits the tenant’s income (neither too
high nor too low). It does not refer to adequacy in terms of physical condition of the
dwelling, or appropriateness for household size. The distinction between the categories is
made since adequate housing may result in higher search costs.
The number of continued contracts is broken down into households in (1) special
dwellings suitable for the elderly and disabled and (2) all other dwellings. Tenants in
special dwellings may demand more time and energy from the corporation staff because
they need more services than others.10
Housing quality is measured by means of the so-called Housing Valuation
Scheme (Woningwaarderingsstelsel, WWS). This assigns points to every dwelling on the
basis of physical characteristics, such as size and type of dwelling, sanitary fittings, energy
efficiency, etc. Because we use both vrs- and crs-specifications, a relative output measure
like the average housing quality would be inappropriate (Podinovski 2004). Instead, we use
the increase in average housing quality, multiplied by the weighted number of dwellings in
the current year as output.
As input we use operational costs which consist of (1) wages and salaries, (2) main-
tenance costs and (3) other operational costs. Including capital expenditures as inputs
would not alter our conclusions, however (details not shown). The number of dwellings at
the start of the year is included as a non-discretionary input. Finally, average age of the
9 We have not explicitly included the number of new developments, since this already pops up in the
(increased) number of inhabited dwellings. As long as a new dwelling remains uninhabited, we argue that it
should not be counted as output since it does not fulfil requirement 3.
10 Note that one may argue that a distinction between types of dwellings (single-family units, multiple
family units) might also be relevant. Including too many outputs might lead to problems of overidentication,
however, meaning that many corporations will be labelled as efficient by definition (Nunamaker 1985).
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housing stock, soil quality11 of the region where the corporation is active, and address
density are included as exogenous variables. A simple regression indicates that corpora-
tions with an older housing stock, a less firm soil and a lower address density are disad-
vantaged. The model specification is presented in Table 1. Descriptive statistics are given
in Table 2.
Outliers have been identified by calculating superefficiency scores. The superefficiency
of dmu i is defined as the efficiency which is found after removing dmu i from the frontier.
In this way, the efficiency score may exceed 1. We have removed all corporations with an
initial superefficiency score of 3 or higher from our data.12
The model used for the stochastic frontier analysis is slightly other than the one for the
data envelopment analysis. We use only three outputs (new allotments, continued contracts
and housing quality) in order to avoid multicollinearity among regressors. The specifica-
tion is given in Table 3.
5.2 Data
The Central Public Housing Fund (CFV) has provided us with a dataset that comprises all
corporations between 2001 and 2010. For 2011 and 2012, we make use of publicly
available data from the Central Public Housing Fund. Municipal data used as control
variables are obtained from Statistics Netherlands.
6 Results
6.1 Efficiency scores and Malmquist indices
Table 4 reveals average efficiency scores of 0.74 (crs) and 0.86 (vrs). About half of the
corporations are located on the vrs-frontier. Average scale efficiency (i.e. crs-efficiency/
vrs-efficiency) is 0.85. This implies that the savings potential by increasing pure technical
efficiency is roughly equal to the potential efficiency gains by changing scale.
Table 1 Model specification DEA
Output Adequate allotments (age\ 65)
Inadequate allotments (age\ 65)
Adequate allotments (age[ 65)
Inadequate allotments (age[ 65)
Continued contracts (ordinary dwellings)
Continued contracts (special dwellings)
Change in housing quality
Input Operational costs
Fixed input Number of dwellings at the beginning of the year
Exogenous variables Average age of dwellings
Soil quality
Address density
11 Part of the Netherlands consists of sinking marshland, which results in relatively high maintenance costs.
12 Different thresholds do not lead to changes in the main conclusions (results not shown).
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Table 5 presents scale (dis)economies in 2012. In 2012, 7 percent of the corporations
operated under economies of scale, while 63 percent had diseconomies of scale. The bulk
of the corporations should therefore be able to improve scale efficiency by reducing their
size. Scale efficiency is highest for corporations with 501–1000 dwellings. For corpora-
tions with more than 2500 dwellings, diseconomies of scale become more prevalent.13
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of housing corporations
Average SD Min Max
Adequate allotments (\65) 375 676 0 5229
Inadequate allotments (\65) 48 120 0 716
Adequate allotments ([65) 60 110 0 1604
Inadequate allotments ([65) 11 33 0 479
Continued contracts (ordinary dwellings) 4830 9080 0 55,316
Continued contracts (special dwellings) 739 1517 0 22,843
Average housing quality 135 13 80 177
Wages and salariesa 3310 6687 0 41,116
Maintenance costsa 6885 12,199 38 70,257
Other operational costsa 3840 8421 0 58,078
Capital expendituresa,b 7700 16,867 0 119,190
Average age of dwellings (years) 33 7 4 62
Address densityc 1472 1086 174 6059
Soil qualityd 1.10 0.15 1 1.76
a Amounts are expressed in thousands of 2012 euros
b Available for 2002–2010 only
c Address density measures the average number of addresses within a radius of 1 kilometre of each address
d A higher value means less favourable soil conditions








Y3 Housing quality (WWS-points)
Exogenous variables
Z1 Average age of dwellings
Z2 Soil quality
Z3 Address density
13 Note that because DEA defines scale by means of all outputs and inputs, not by number of dwellings, it is
possible that both economies and diseconomies of scale occur within the group of corporations with
1001–2500 dwellings (and in other groups). Also, not all corporations with more than 2500 dwellings
operate under diseconomies of scale. In other words: one cannot simply point out an optimal number of
dwellings.
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To investigate efficiency changes over time, bootstrapped Malmquist indices are pre-
sented in Table 6.14 An index above (below) one indicates an increase (decrease) in effi-
ciency. The index of total factor productivity change is decomposed into pure efficiency
change, technological change and scale efficiency change (see the ‘‘Appendix’’ for details).
We may compare these factors for both merged and unmerged corporations to see whether
there is a structural difference between the two groups. Table 6 indicates that in most years,
the change in pure efficiency is higher for merged corporations than for unmerged corpo-
rations. This gives some evidence in support of the shake-up hypothesis. On the other hand,
each year, merged corporations have a lower scale effect, meaning that mergers often lead
to, or increase, diseconomies of scale. Finally, it seems that from 2009 onwards, a trend of
increasing productivity has set in. This may be a consequence of the increased attention that
the subject of efficiency has received in recent years (Nieboer and Gruis 2016).
Note, however, that the Malmquist indices show peaks and dips that may seem
unreasonably strong. This is why we will also conduct a parametric approach to test the
robustness of these numbers (see Sect. 6.4).









Total efficiency 2002–2012 0.74 0.20 25 0.24
Pure technical efficiency 2002–2012 0.86 0.17 50 0.26
Scale efficiency 2002–2012 0.85 0.16 25 0.36
N runs from 461 in 2002 to 319 in 2012




















\= 500 30 0.97 37 63 0
501–1000 29 0.995 14 72 14
1001–2500 81 0.96 7 36 57
2501–5000 61 0.92 2 23 75
5001–10,000 67 0.85 0 13 87
[10,000 59 0.75 0 12 88
All corporations 327 0.90 7 30 63
In 2012, the total number of corporations was 381. Due to data omissions, this dataset comprises 327
corporations
14 Simar and Wilson (1998a, 1999) note that efficiency scores estimated by means of DEA may be biased
because they are derived using finite data samples. The true production possibility frontier is not observed;
changing the data would change the results. Statistical estimation needs replication of the data-generating
process. Therefore, we use the bootstrap procedure of Simar & Wilson (1999), replicating the data-gen-
erating process in order to correct for potential biases and obtain confidence intervals (see also Arjomandi
et al. 2011; Gitto and Mancuso 2012).
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6.2 Relation between scale, mergers and efficiency: baseline results
To test the shake-up hypothesis, we estimate a regression with the Malmquist components
as dependent variables. We relate scale increases and mergers to both total (crs-)efficiency
and pure technical (vrs-)efficiency. The ‘‘Appendix’’ to this paper provides details. Table 7
presents results. The first column gives the effects of a change in the number of dwellings
and of merger activity on total efficiency change (see Eq. 9a in the ‘‘Appendix’’). The
second column gives the effect on pure technical efficiency change (Eq. 9b).15
Note that corporations can alter their scale in two ways: through organic growth
(building, buying) and by merging. To disentangle these two components, we include both
a variable measuring the scale level that has been reached through organic growth
(dwellings organic) and a variable measuring the number of dwellings obtained by
merging (dwellings merger).16










2002/2003 1.3072 0.8217 0.7774 0.8425
2003/2004 1.2332 0.9527 0.8862 0.8913
2004/2005 1.0944 0.9777 0.8565 0.854
2005/2006 1.235 1.0459 1.1128 1.1263
2006/2007 1.2051 0.9266 1.0336 0.9104
2007/2008 1.1336 1.1144 0.8975 1.0041
2008/2009 0.907 1.1115 0.9267 0.935
2009/2010 1.2931 0.9168 0.9532 1.0266
2010/2011 1.1796 1.3259 0.9298 1.4236
2011/2012 1.4058 0.7621 0.9502 0.9957
Unmerged corporations
2002/2003 1.2074 0.8553 1.0217 1.0275
2003/2004 1.1321 0.9912 1.1526 1.0842
2004/2005 1.0777 0.9828 0.8928 0.9716
2005/2006 1.1203 1.0227 1.2179 1.0544
2006/2007 1.1485 0.9352 1.255 1.0172
2007/2008 1.0059 1.0222 1.046 0.9946
2008/2009 0.9404 1.0995 0.9736 1.0122
2009/2010 1.3218 0.8765 1.0433 1.1116
2010/2011 0.9698 1.2746 0.9912 1.1927
2011/2012 1.4598 0.769 1.0485 1.1131
15 We do not include a column with the effects of mergers on scale efficiency, as this would not be very
informative. Indeed, if two corporations that already operate under diseconomies scale merge, diseconomies
will increase by definition (and scale efficiency would decrease). Note, however, that the regression of
mergers on total efficiency also includes a component of scale efficiency. This column is included in order to
show the net effect of mergers on total factor productivity.
16 These variables are constructed as follows. In the first year of measurement (2002), dwellings organic
simply equals the total number of dwellings of each corporation and dwellings merger is zero. Dwellings
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Table 7 Regressions of DEA-efficiency measures on scale and mergers



















0.1070*** 0.1053*** 0.0976*** 0.0879*** -0.0993*** -0.0196
(3.8003) (4.1804) (3.6131) (3.9680) (-2.6371) (-0.5792)
Dwellings
organic year
t - 1 (*1000)
-0.1355*** -0.0744*** -0.1206*** -0.0515***




-0.0016 0.0131*** -0.0022 0.0137*** -0.0080 0.0168**
(-0.4280) (3.0089) (-0.5638) (3.0642) (-0.9126) (2.1417)
Dwellings2
(*1000)
-0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0000 -0.0001**
(-0.2207) (-2.3719) (0.0257) (-2.3651) (0.3577) (-2.1093)
Merger year t -0.0435 -0.0007 -0.0533* -0.0071 -0.0245 -0.0435
(-1.5583) (-0.0255) (-1.9528) (-0.2622) (-0.5109) (-0.9856)
Merger year
t - 1
-0.0169 0.0399 -0.0213 0.0386 -0.0070 0.0041
(-0.5959) (1.5522) (-0.7675) (1.5299) (-0.1525) (0.1172)
Merger year
t - 2
-0.0233 -0.0190 -0.0269 -0.0158 -0.0117 -0.0393
(-0.7944) (-0.6233) (-0.8592) (-0.4849) (-0.2735) (-0.9980)
Merger year
t – 3, …, T
0.0201 0.0299 0.0181 0.0434 0.0091 -0.0052
(0.5798) (0.9794) (0.4595) (1.2843) (0.1809) (-0.1203)
Average age of
housing stocka
-0.0142*** -0.0124*** -0.0101** -0.0084 -0.0118*** -0.0113***
(-3.5663) (-3.2326) (-2.0770) (-1.5504) (-3.2416) (-3.0507)
Soil qualitya -0.1155 0.1225 -0.1859 -0.1529 0.1122 0.2406
(-0.5872) (0.6055) (-0.6305) (-0.5166) (0.4953) (1.0665)
Densitya 0.0825*** 0.0620** 0.0791*** 0.0547* 0.0946*** 0.0512
(3.4495) (2.3751) (2.9332) (1.7969) (2.5904) (1.5332)
Constant -0.2139 -0.7225*** -0.3303 -0.6460*
(-0.9967) (-2.9178) (-1.1019) (-1.7465)
N 3912 3912 1701 1701 3135 3135





Panel analysis 2002–2012. Fixed effects and year effects included. Robust t statistics (regressions 1–4) and
z statistics (regressions 5–6) (based on clustered standard errors) between brackets
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05, * p\ 0.1
a As a bootstrap specification does not allow the model to control for exogenous characteristics, the
efficiency scores cannot be corrected for differences in exogenous factors a priori. Therefore, these factors
have to be included as control variables in the regression equation
Footnote 16 continued
organic increases or decreases throughout the years if the corporation alters its housing stock by building,
demolishing, buying or selling. Dwellings merger increases by the extent of a merger, if a merger occurs. By
definition, the sum of the two variables equals the total housing stock of the corporation.
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Organic growth appears to have a positive impact on pure technical efficiency in the
same year (regression 2). This impact is moderated by a negative lagged effect, however.
This is probably a result of how we use the data. If a corporation builds dwellings at the
end of year t, we perceive it as a scale increase in year t. Total costs in year t will probably
increase only moderately, since in the first months of the year nothing happened. The net
effect of organic growth on pure technical efficiency is still positive, however
[0.1053–0.0744 = 0.0309 (or 3 percent for an increase in the number of dwellings by
1000)]. The effect of growth by merger is smaller (0.0131 or 1.3 percent) but significant.17
This supports the shake-up hypothesis. It is also consistent with the findings of Lupton and
Kent-Smith (2012) that merging may be beneficial because it leads to a reconsideration of
existing practices, thereby improving pure technical efficiency. According to regression
(2), this does not only hold for merging but for organic growth as well.
Note that the effects are economically small: a scale increase of 1000 dwellings leads to
an increase in pure technical efficiency of about 1.3–3 percent (minus the very small effect
of the quadratic term). Such scale increases only occur with mergers. Organic growth deals
with much smaller numbers.
The effect of merging on total efficiency (regression 1) is not significantly different
from zero. This is not surprising, considering our earlier result that many corporations
operate under diseconomies of scale. The net effect of organic growth
(0.1070–0.1355 = -0.0285) is negative, however, indicating that the decrease in scale
efficiency dominates the increase in pure technical efficiency. This indicates that organic
growth is unfavourable from an efficiency point of view.
In short, growth—whether organic or by merger—seems to improve pure technical
efficiency. However, it appears that increasing scale does not succeed in raising total
productivity, because for many corporations, it reduces scale efficiency. This indicates the
existence of a merger paradox.
6.3 Robustness tests with DEA
The results from regressions (1) and (2) in Table 7 may be biased because the decision to
merge is obviously not a random (or purely exogenous) process. It may depend upon many
factors, one of which might be pre-merger efficiency. Similarly, organic growth may also
be driven by initial efficiency. As a result, our control group includes corporations that may
be incomparable because they did not merge.
The selection effect of merging can be mitigated by dropping the corporations that did
not merge in our research period from the regressions. The control group then consists of
corporations that merged, just like the treatment group, but in a different year. Regressions
(3) and (4) in Table 7 give the results, which turn out to be very similar to regressions (1
and 2). Therefore, it appears that our results are not driven by a selection effect.
Concerning organic scale increases, the reverse causation problem may be dealt with by
means of instrumental variables (IV) regression. We instrument the number and the
squared number of dwellings by (1) the (first and second order) lagged number of
dwellings, (2) the (first and second order) lagged number of dwellings, squared and (3) the
number of dwellings that the subnational government is planning to facilitate in the region
where the corporation is active. The latter variable is based on De Nieuwe Kaart van
Nederland, a dataset comprising all housing projects that subnational governments are
17 Because the lagged variable of dwellings merger is not significant, we dropped this variable from the
regression.
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planning to implement. We presume that corporations operating in regions with such plans
have a stronger incentive for organic growth than others. Also, we assume this variable is
exogenous as it reflects decisions of subnational governments, not corporations.
Regressions (5) and (6) in Table 7 give the results of the IV-regression. According to
regression (6), growth by merger still increases pure technical efficiency, but organic
growth loses significance. This implies that the net effect of organic growth clearly is
negative (regression (5)). The net effect of a merger on total efficiency remains insignif-
icant, still indicating the existence of a merger paradox.
6.4 Robustness check with SFA
The average (pure technical) efficiency scores from the stochastic frontier analysis are
given in Table 8. Average inefficiency amounts to about 25–30 percent per year, which is
higher than under DEA.
As noted, just as under DEA, SFA allows us to construct measures of total productivity
change and decompositions into (1) pure technical efficiency change, (2) a scale effect and
(3) technological change (see the ‘‘Appendix’’ for calculations). Table 9 provides the
results.
Several issues pop up. First, it appears that pure technical efficiency change is close to
zero in most cases. This holds both for corporations that merged and for those that did not
merge. That is, these figures fail to affirm the shake-up hypothesis that pure technical
efficiency change is higher for institutions that merge. This conflicts with the DEA-results.
Secondly, the scale effect turns out to be negative for corporations that have merged,
affirming the notion that merging leads to increased diseconomies of scale. For corpora-
tions that did not merge, there was hardly any scale effect since their scale changed only
marginally. So according to these results, mergers were unfavourable and we do not find a
merger paradox. Note that in the final 2 years (2010/2011 and 2011/2012) the scale effect
was very moderate, even for corporations that merged. So it seems that the scale issue may
become less important over time. Secondly, total factor productivity change is negative in
most years, but turns positive in the final few years. This may be a consequence of the
increased public attention that the subject of efficiency has received in recent years as a
result of the incidents (see also Sect. 6.1).
Table 8 Efficiency scores SFA
Year N Mean SD Min Max
2001 525 0.69 0.08 0.38 0.97
2002 546 0.70 0.08 0.39 0.97
2003 531 0.70 0.08 0.40 0.97
2004 508 0.71 0.08 0.40 0.97
2005 494 0.71 0.08 0.41 0.97
2006 490 0.72 0.08 0.42 0.97
2007 453 0.72 0.07 0.54 0.96
2008 445 0.73 0.07 0.55 0.96
2009 426 0.73 0.07 0.55 0.97
2010 414 0.74 0.07 0.56 0.97
2011 388 0.75 0.07 0.57 0.97
2012 374 0.75 0.07 0.58 0.97
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7 Conclusion
This paper presents estimates of the efficiency of Dutch housing corporations and inves-
tigates the relationship between scale and efficiency. A data envelopment analysis indicates
that the potential to improve pure technical efficiency is about 15 percent. If corporations
would optimize their scale, a further gain of around 15 percent could be realized. Fur-
thermore, total productivity failed to increase between 2002 and 2009. Thereafter, an
upward trend seems to have set in.
The social housing sector has experienced many mergers throughout the years. We find
that most housing corporations operate under diseconomies of scale, meaning that mergers
could be undesirable. However, a merger might also have beneficial effects on pure
technical efficiency, possibly because it forces parties to reconsider their existing practices
and gives an opportunity to learn from each other. A data envelopment analysis confirms
this shake-up hypothesis because a merger seems to have a positive effect on pure technical
efficiency. However, a stochastic frontier analysis fails to replicate this result, indicating
that the support for our shake-up hypothesis is not robust.
Furthermore, we argue that even if there would be such a positive effect, this should not
be used as a justification to merge. Indeed, high technical efficiency should be attainable










2001/2002 0.0085 -0.0549 -0.0618 -0.1083
2002/2003 0.0084 -0.0456 -0.0565 -0.0937
2003/2004 0.0083 -0.0398 -0.0676 -0.0991
2004/2005 0.0080 -0.0323 -0.0482 -0.0725
2005/2006 0.0078 -0.0234 -0.0464 -0.0620
2006/2007 0.0081 -0.0174 -0.036 -0.0453
2007/2008 0.0081 -0.0093 -0.0358 -0.0371
2008/2009 0.0075 -0.0032 -0.025 -0.0207
2009/2010 0.0072 0.0066 -0.0257 -0.0118
2010/2011 0.0069 0.011 -0.0203 -0.0024
2011/2012 0.0065 0.0177 -0.0106 0.0137
Unmerged corporations
2001/2002 0.0088 -0.0586 0.0004 -0.0493
2002/2003 0.0086 -0.0519 0.0004 -0.043
2003/2004 0.0084 -0.0444 0.0000 -0.0361
2004/2005 0.0082 -0.0369 0.0000 -0.0287
2005/2006 0.008 -0.0295 0.0000 -0.0215
2006/2007 0.0078 -0.0218 0.0001 -0.0139
2007/2008 0.0076 -0.0147 0.0000 -0.0071
2008/2009 0.0074 -0.0076 -0.0002 -0.0003
2009/2010 0.0072 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0071
2010/2011 0.0071 0.0076 0.0000 0.0147
2011/2012 0.0069 0.0105 0.0000 0.0220
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without merging as well. That is, no merger should be needed to optimize current pro-
cesses. Ideally, decisions about changing the scale should be based upon the presence of
(dis)economies of scale.
In order to improve our understanding of potential shake-up effects of mergers, case
studies might be considered. Also, apart from mergers, many other factors may impact
housing corporation efficiency, e.g. leadership, market power, organizational structure.
Much work remains to be done.
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Appendix: data envelopment analysis
Data envelopment analysis was introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) who based their
method on the ideas of Farrell (1957). The method constructs the best practice frontier of a
group of decision making units (dmu’s) by solving a set of linear programming problems.
This frontier gives all combinations of inputs and outputs that are relatively efficient.
Consequently, every dmu is compared to this frontier to determine its efficiency. The
inefficient dmu’s lie inside the frontier. The further away from the frontier, the less effi-
cient a dmu is.








Here hi denotes the efficiency score of dmu i, and xi and yi are, respectively, the input and
output vectors of dmu i. X and Y are the input and output matrices for the entire set of
dmu’s. Finally, k is a vector of weights to be determined in the optimization problem, so
that Xk and Yk are the weighted sum of, respectively, inputs and outputs of a ‘virtual dmu’.
In the model, we thus search whether there exists a possibility to ‘defeat’ dmu i, by
constructing a virtual dmu, being a linear combination of all existing dmu’s.
The virtual dmu needs to meet the requirements that it produces at least as many outputs
and uses less input compared to dmu i. If we fail to construct a virtual dmu that meets these
requirements, the efficiency score of dmu i obtains its maximum value of 1. The efficiency
score hi thus reveals by how much total input of dmu i could decrease without decreasing
output (‘measure of defeat’). The virtual dmu succeeds in producing the same amount of
output as dmu i using only a fraction hi of inputs. Similarly, one could also choose an
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output orientation where the efficiency score can be interpreted as the percentage with
which output could increase without increasing input.
Note that specification (1) does not impose any constraints on the weights of the virtual
dmu. Therefore, an extra constraint on the weights might be introduced allowing for a
variable returns to scale (vrs) technology:
k01N ¼ 1 ð2Þ
where 1N is a vector of ones. Under this constraint, the virtual dmu has to be of the same
size as dmu i.
Non-discretionary inputs and exogenous variables
Some inputs may be non-discretionary (or fixed). These inputs are relevant factors in the
production process in year t but cannot be influenced anymore during the production
process (see Banker and Morey 1986). Denoting such variables by the vector qi, we include
as a constraint:
Qk qi ð3Þ
As noted in Sect. 4.2, closely related to the concept of fixed inputs is the idea that there
may exist exogenous variables that influence efficiency scores. Several methods to take
these exogenous variables into account are available. We follow an approach suggested by
Ruggiero (1998), consisting of three steps. In the first step, an ordinary DEA is performed.
Next, regression analysis is used to investigate which exogenous factors have an impact on
efficiency.
Efficiency ¼ b0 þ
XR
r¼1
brzr þ e ð4Þ
where zr (r = 1,…, R) are the relevant exogenous variables. In the second step, a variable Z





A higher value of Z thus indicates a bigger advantage. In the third step, the DEA is
repeated with the extra restriction:
kj ¼ 0 if Zi\Zj ð6Þ
Due to this restriction, dmu i can only be compared with other dmu’s that are not
exogenously advantaged relative to dmu i. In other words, advantaged dmu’s are being
removed from the best practice frontier.18
18 We round off this variable, however, to deal with problems of infeasibility. Note that under the method of
Ruggiero (1998), the most disadvantaged dmu is efficient by definition as it cannot be compared with any
other dmu. The dmu with the second-most disadvantaged position is very likely to be efficient as well, since
it can only be compared with the corporation with the most disadvantaged position. Because we believe that
in our case a minor change in exogenous variables is not crucial for efficiency, we round off variable Z in
order to categorize each corporation in one of twelve clusters. Corporations in the same cluster are assumed
to have comparable exogenous circumstances.
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Malmquist indices
The Malmquist index (see Fa¨re et al. 1994; Coelli 1996) is calculated by comparing two










where Mtfpch is the total factor productivity change of a dmu and TEt?1,t
crs is the constant
returns to scale efficiency score for a certain dmu where the input/output vector in period
t ? 1 is compared to the technology in period t. The index is thus the geometric mean of
two measures of efficiency change (one relative to the frontier in year t, and the other
relative to the frontier in year t ? 1).
Total factor productivity change can be written as the product of Mtechch, a change in
technology (i.e. the total shift of the frontier over time), andMeffch, the change in efficiency
(the extent to which a dmu approaches the frontier) (Coelli 1996):
Mtfpch ¼ Mtechch Meffch ð8aÞ
Under a crs specification, Meffch (i.e. approaching the crs-frontier) can be subdivided into
pure technical efficiency change (Mpech; i.e. approaching the vrs-frontier) and scale effi-
ciency change (Msech; i.e. operating on a more efficient scale):
Meffch ¼ Mpech Msech ð8bÞ
In the example of Fig. 2, a movement from E to C resembles pure efficiency change and a
movement from C to B indicates an increase in scale efficiency.
Estimating the effects of mergers on scale efficiency and pure technical
efficiency
In our analysis, we empirically investigate the effects of scale increases and mergers on
efficiency. Because we are dealing with panel data, a dependent variable has to be con-
structed that can be compared over time. Therefore, we define efficiency in year t as the
efficiency in year t - 1 multiplied by the relevant (bootstrapped) Malmquist index
between t - 1 and t. For example, if total efficiency (Efftfp) for a certain dmu is 0.5 in the
first year and the Malmquist index (Mtfpch) equals 1.5 in the following year, our measure of
efficiency in the second year equals 0.5*1.5 = 0.75.
We express efficiency in natural logarithms so that each year, the dependent variable
changes with (the logarithm of) the Malmquist index. The dependent variables, respec-
tively, total efficiency and pure technical efficiency thus read:
ln Efftfpt








  ¼ ln Effpet1 Mpecht1;t
 
¼ ln Effpet1
 þ ln Mpecht1;t
 
ð9bÞ
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Stochastic frontier analysis
A stochastic frontier analysis econometrically estimates a production or cost function. We
estimate the following translog cost function, using the random effects model of Battese
and Coelli (1992):
ln Cð Þ ¼ a0 þ
XM
m¼1
bmln Ymð Þ þ
XK
k¼1

























wmln Ymð Þt þ vþ u
ð10Þ
where C = costs; Ym = output (m = 1, …, M); Zk = exogenous factor (k = 1, …, K);
v = random error term (normal distribution); u = inefficiency term (truncated normal
distribution); t = time.
Note that we do not include input prices because these are not available. We correct our
cost measures for inflation in order to make them comparable over the years.19 This is more
appropriate than explicitly including price indices in the model, since these indices would
suffer from multicollinearity with t.
Also, for estimation, we have standardized the data to the mean beforehand (i.e. for each
variable C, Y or Z we divide each observation by its mean in 2012). Standardization has the
advantage that the estimated parameters can be interpreted as elasticities at the sample
mean (Ollinger et al. 2000). Also, standardization reduces the problem of multicollinearity
between linear, squared and cross terms (Tovar et al. 2007).
The results of the estimation are given in Table 10.
Decomposing total factor productivity change
The coefficients of the cost function, together with the efficiency scores, may be used to
decompose total factor productivity change into (1) the change in efficiency, (2) techno-
logical change and (3) a scale effect (see, e.g. Orea 2002; Abdul-Majid et al. 2011). In
general, we have:
Tfp change ¼ efficiency changeþ technological changeþ scale effect ð11Þ










o ln Citþ1ð Þ
ot







½ SFitþ1emitþ1 þ SFitemitð Þðymitþ1  ymitÞ ð12aÞ
where:
19 To be precise, we correct wages and salaries by means of a general wage index. Maintenance costs are
corrected by means of a housing development price index (which takes into account the change in the price
of materials and the change in wages for persons employed in housing construction). Other current
expenditures are corrected by means of the general consumer price index.
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Dealing with unbalanced panel data
Note that we have an unbalanced panel because of the mergers. We handle this by taking
the corporation classification of the first year (2001) as a starting point. If two corporations
(A and B) merge to one corporation (AB) between 2001 and 2002, we thus still have two
separate observations in 2002 (that is, corporation AB now returns twice in the dataset). So,
in effect, we estimate both the efficiency effects of A growing towards AB and of B
growing towards AB. Note that in this case, we would have ‘identical twins’ in our dataset
Table 10 Cost function estimates (translog cost function)
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient
Y1 0.1176*** Z1 * Z1 0.2232*** Z3 * Y1 -0.0819
(3.9548) (4.8887) (-1.2199)
Y2 0.9596*** Z2 * Z2 0.0160 Z3 * Y2 0.0768
(29.4856) (0.5322) (0.9933)
Y3 0.4012** Z3 * Z3 0.2358 Z3 * Y3 0.5972
(2.3142) (0.3592) (1.5504)
Z1 0.4365*** Z1 * Z2 0.0334 t 0.0607***
(8.6970) (0.7020) (8.0025)
Z2 -0.0137 Z1 * Z3 -1.2380*** t * t -0.0072***
(-0.7535) (-4.2929) (-8.4641)
Z3 0.0966 Z2 * Z3 0.1404 Y1 * t -0.0053***
(1.1731) (1.5398) (-2.6800)
Y1 * Y1 0.0108 Z1 * Y1 0.0176 Y2 * t -0.0000
(1.3510) (0.6659) (-0.0021)
Y2 * Y2 0.0425*** Z1 * Y2 0.0114 Y3 * t -0.0226
(3.5749) (0.3935) (-1.4070)
Y3 * Y3 -0.0576 Z1 * Y3 0.0633 DummyY1 ¼ 0 0.1861
(-0.1706) (0.3704) (1.5162)
Y1 * Y2 -0.0254*** Z2 * Y1 0.0202* Constant -0.5096***
(-3.7178) (1.9444) (-8.3279)
Y1 * Y3 0.0479 Z2 * Y2 -0.0218* Observations 5594
(0.6409) (-1.6486) Years 2001–2012
Y2 * Y3 0.0153 Z2 * Y3 0.1025
(0.1863) (1.1688)
Results based on the random effects model of Battese and Coelli (1992) with a truncated normal distribution
of the efficiency term
z statistics in parentheses (based on clustered standard errors)
*** p\ 0.01; ** p\ 0.05; * p\ 0.1
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from 2003 onwards (as AB pops up two times each year). Therefore, we exclude one of
these ‘identical twins’ from our regression from 2003 onwards.
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